Vannevar Bush
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Bush accepted a job with Tufts, where he became involved with the American Radio and Research Corporation (AMRAD), which began broadcasting music from the campus on March 8, 1916. The station owner, Harold Power, hired him to run the company's laboratory, at a salary greater than that which Bush drew from Tufts. In 1917, following the United States' entry into World War I, he went to work with the [[United States National Research Council|National Research Council]]. He attempted to develop a [[magnetic anomaly detector|means of detecting submarines]] by measuring the disturbance in the Earth's magnetic field. His device worked as designed, but only from a wooden ship; attempts to get it to work on a metal ship such as a [[destroyer]] failed.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=33–38}} |
Bush accepted a job with Tufts, where he became involved with the American Radio and Research Corporation (AMRAD), which began broadcasting music from the campus on March 8, 1916. The station owner, Harold Power, hired him to run the company's laboratory, at a salary greater than that which Bush drew from Tufts. In 1917, following the United States' entry into World War I, he went to work with the [[United States National Research Council|National Research Council]]. He attempted to develop a [[magnetic anomaly detector|means of detecting submarines]] by measuring the disturbance in the Earth's magnetic field. His device worked as designed, but only from a wooden ship; attempts to get it to work on a metal ship such as a [[destroyer]] failed.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=33–38}} |
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Bush left Tufts in 1919, although he remained employed by AMRAD, and joined the Department of Electrical Engineering at [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]] (MIT), where he worked under [[Dugald C. Jackson]]. In 1922, he collaborated with fellow MIT professor William H. Timbie on ''Principles of Electrical Engineering'', an introductory textbook. AMRAD's lucrative contracts from World War I had been cancelled, and Bush attempted to reverse the company's fortunes by developing a [[Thermal cutoff|thermostatic switch]] invented by [[John A. Spencer (inventor)|Al Spencer]], an AMRAD technician, on his own time. AMRAD's management was not interested in the device, but had no objection to its sale. Bush found backing from Laurence K. Marshall and [[Richard S. Aldrich]] to create the Spencer Thermostat Company, which hired Bush as a consultant. The new company soon had revenues in excess of a million dollars.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=39–43}} It merged with General Plate Company to form Metals & Controls Corporation in 1931, and with [[Texas Instruments]] in 1959. Texas Instruments sold it to [[Bain Capital]] in 2006, and it became a separate company again as Sensata Technologies in 2010.{{cite web |title=History of Our Company |url=http://investors.sensata.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=210277&p=irol-historycomp |access-date=June 14, 2014 |publisher=Sensata Technologies |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://archive. |
Bush left Tufts in 1919, although he remained employed by AMRAD, and joined the Department of Electrical Engineering at [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]] (MIT), where he worked under [[Dugald C. Jackson]]. In 1922, he collaborated with fellow MIT professor William H. Timbie on ''Principles of Electrical Engineering'', an introductory textbook. AMRAD's lucrative contracts from World War I had been cancelled, and Bush attempted to reverse the company's fortunes by developing a [[Thermal cutoff|thermostatic switch]] invented by [[John A. Spencer (inventor)|Al Spencer]], an AMRAD technician, on his own time. AMRAD's management was not interested in the device, but had no objection to its sale. Bush found backing from Laurence K. Marshall and [[Richard S. Aldrich]] to create the Spencer Thermostat Company, which hired Bush as a consultant. The new company soon had revenues in excess of a million dollars.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=39–43}} It merged with General Plate Company to form Metals & Controls Corporation in 1931, and with [[Texas Instruments]] in 1959. Texas Instruments sold it to [[Bain Capital]] in 2006, and it became a separate company again as Sensata Technologies in 2010.{{cite web |title=History of Our Company |url=http://investors.sensata.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=210277&p=irol-historycomp |access-date=June 14, 2014 |publisher=Sensata Technologies |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131029170349/http://investors.sensata.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=210277&p=irol-historycomp |archive-date=October 29, 2013 }} |
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In 1924, Bush and Marshall teamed up with physicist Charles G. Smith, who had invented a [[voltage-regulator tube]] called the S-tube. The device enabled radios, which had previously required two different types of batteries, to operate from [[Mains electricity|mains power]]. Marshall had raised $25,000 to set up the American Appliance Company on July 7, 1922, to build silent refrigerators, with Bush and Smith among its five directors, but changed course and renamed it the [[Raytheon Company]], to make and market the S-tube. The venture made Bush wealthy, and Raytheon ultimately became a large electronics company and [[defense contractor]].{{cite web |url=http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Raytheon-Company-Company-History.html |title=Raytheon Company |work=International Directory of Company Histories |volume=38 |publisher=St. James Press |year=2001 |access-date=May 31, 2012}}{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=39–43}} |
In 1924, Bush and Marshall teamed up with physicist Charles G. Smith, who had invented a [[voltage-regulator tube]] called the S-tube. The device enabled radios, which had previously required two different types of batteries, to operate from [[Mains electricity|mains power]]. Marshall had raised $25,000 to set up the American Appliance Company on July 7, 1922, to build silent refrigerators, with Bush and Smith among its five directors, but changed course and renamed it the [[Raytheon Company]], to make and market the S-tube. The venture made Bush wealthy, and Raytheon ultimately became a large electronics company and [[defense contractor]].{{cite web |url=http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Raytheon-Company-Company-History.html |title=Raytheon Company |work=International Directory of Company Histories |volume=38 |publisher=St. James Press |year=2001 |access-date=May 31, 2012}}{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=39–43}} |
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Bush met with Roosevelt and Vice President [[Henry A. Wallace]] on October 9, 1941, to discuss the project. He briefed Roosevelt on [[Tube Alloys]], the British atomic bomb project and its [[Maud Committee]], which had concluded that an atomic bomb was feasible, and on the [[German nuclear energy project]], about which little was known. Roosevelt approved and expedited the atomic program. To control it, he created a Top Policy Group consisting of himself—although he never attended a meeting—Wallace, Bush, Conant, Stimson and the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|Chief of Staff of the Army]], [[General (United States)|General]] [[George Marshall]].{{sfn|Hewlett|Anderson|1962|pp=45–46}} On Bush's advice, Roosevelt chose the army to run the project rather than the navy, although the navy had shown far more interest in the field, and was already conducting research into atomic energy for powering ships. Bush's negative experiences with the Navy had convinced him that it would not listen to his advice, and could not handle large-scale construction projects.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|p=203}}{{sfn|Hewlett|Anderson|1962|pp=51, 71–72}} |
Bush met with Roosevelt and Vice President [[Henry A. Wallace]] on October 9, 1941, to discuss the project. He briefed Roosevelt on [[Tube Alloys]], the British atomic bomb project and its [[Maud Committee]], which had concluded that an atomic bomb was feasible, and on the [[German nuclear energy project]], about which little was known. Roosevelt approved and expedited the atomic program. To control it, he created a Top Policy Group consisting of himself—although he never attended a meeting—Wallace, Bush, Conant, Stimson and the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|Chief of Staff of the Army]], [[General (United States)|General]] [[George Marshall]].{{sfn|Hewlett|Anderson|1962|pp=45–46}} On Bush's advice, Roosevelt chose the army to run the project rather than the navy, although the navy had shown far more interest in the field, and was already conducting research into atomic energy for powering ships. Bush's negative experiences with the Navy had convinced him that it would not listen to his advice, and could not handle large-scale construction projects.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|p=203}}{{sfn|Hewlett|Anderson|1962|pp=51, 71–72}} |
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In March 1942, Bush sent a report to Roosevelt outlining work by [[Robert Oppenheimer]] on the [[nuclear cross section]] of |
In March 1942, Bush sent a report to Roosevelt outlining work by [[Robert Oppenheimer]] on the [[nuclear cross section]] of uranium-235. Oppenheimer's calculations, which Bush had [[George Kistiakowsky]] check, estimated that the [[critical mass]] of a sphere of [[Uranium-235]] was in the range of 2.5 to 5 kilograms, with a destructive power of around 2,000 tons of TNT. Moreover, it appeared that [[plutonium]] might be even more [[fissile]].{{sfn|Hewlett|Anderson|1962|p=61}} After conferring with Brigadier General [[Lucius D. Clay]] about the construction requirements, Bush drew up a submission for $85 million in [[fiscal year]] 1943 for four pilot plants, which he forwarded to Roosevelt on June 17, 1942. With the Army on board, Bush moved to streamline oversight of the project by the OSRD, replacing the Section S-1 with a new S-1 Executive Committee.{{sfn|Hewlett|Anderson|1962|pp=72–75}} |
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A week later, on June 23, President Roosevelt sent this one-sentence memo back to Bush: ''"Do you have the money?"'' |
A week later, on June 23, President Roosevelt sent this one-sentence memo back to Bush: ''"Do you have the money?"'' |
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In July 1945, the Kilgore bill was introduced in Congress, proposing the appointment and removal of a single science administrator by the president, with emphasis on applied research, and a patent clause favoring a government monopoly. In contrast, the competing Magnuson bill was similar to Bush's proposal to vest control in a panel of top scientists and civilian administrators with the executive director appointed by them. The Magnuson bill emphasized basic research and protected private patent rights.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=253–256}} A compromise Kilgore–Magnuson bill of February 1946 passed the Senate but expired in the House because Bush favored a competing bill that was a virtual duplicate of Magnuson's original bill.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|p=328}} A Senate bill was introduced in February 1947 to create the National Science Foundation (NSF) to replace the OSRD. This bill favored most of the features advocated by Bush, including the controversial administration by an autonomous scientific board. The bill passed the Senate and the House, but was [[pocket veto]]ed by Truman on August 6, on the grounds that the administrative officers were not properly responsible to either the president or Congress.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|p=332}} The OSRD was abolished without a successor organization on December 31, 1947.{{cite web |url=https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/227.html |publisher=[[National Archives and Records Administration]] |title=Records of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) |access-date=May 21, 2012}} |
In July 1945, the Kilgore bill was introduced in Congress, proposing the appointment and removal of a single science administrator by the president, with emphasis on applied research, and a patent clause favoring a government monopoly. In contrast, the competing Magnuson bill was similar to Bush's proposal to vest control in a panel of top scientists and civilian administrators with the executive director appointed by them. The Magnuson bill emphasized basic research and protected private patent rights.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=253–256}} A compromise Kilgore–Magnuson bill of February 1946 passed the Senate but expired in the House because Bush favored a competing bill that was a virtual duplicate of Magnuson's original bill.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|p=328}} A Senate bill was introduced in February 1947 to create the National Science Foundation (NSF) to replace the OSRD. This bill favored most of the features advocated by Bush, including the controversial administration by an autonomous scientific board. The bill passed the Senate and the House, but was [[pocket veto]]ed by Truman on August 6, on the grounds that the administrative officers were not properly responsible to either the president or Congress.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|p=332}} The OSRD was abolished without a successor organization on December 31, 1947.{{cite web |url=https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/227.html |publisher=[[National Archives and Records Administration]] |title=Records of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) |access-date=May 21, 2012}} |
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Without a [[National Science Foundation]], the military stepped in, with the [[Office of Naval Research]] (ONR) filling the gap. The war had accustomed many scientists to working without the budgetary constraints imposed by pre-war universities.{{sfn|Hershberg|1993|p=397}} Bush helped create the Joint Research and Development Board (JRDB) of the Army and Navy, of which he was chairman. With passage of the [[National Security Act of 1947|National Security Act]] on July 26, 1947, the JRDB became the Research and Development Board (RDB). Its role was to promote research through the military until a bill creating the National Science Foundation finally became law.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=318–323}} By 1953, the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] was spending $1.6 billion a year on research; physicists were spending 70 percent of their time on defense related research, and 98 percent of the money spent on physics came from either the Department of Defense or the [[United States Atomic Energy Commission|Atomic Energy Commission]] (AEC), which took over from the Manhattan Project on January 1, 1947.{{sfn|Hershberg|1993|pp=305–309}} Legislation to create the |
Without a [[National Science Foundation]], the military stepped in, with the [[Office of Naval Research]] (ONR) filling the gap. The war had accustomed many scientists to working without the budgetary constraints imposed by pre-war universities.{{sfn|Hershberg|1993|p=397}} Bush helped create the Joint Research and Development Board (JRDB) of the Army and Navy, of which he was chairman. With passage of the [[National Security Act of 1947|National Security Act]] on July 26, 1947, the JRDB became the Research and Development Board (RDB). Its role was to promote research through the military until a bill creating the National Science Foundation finally became law.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=318–323}} By 1953, the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] was spending $1.6 billion a year on research; physicists were spending 70 percent of their time on defense related research, and 98 percent of the money spent on physics came from either the Department of Defense or the [[United States Atomic Energy Commission|Atomic Energy Commission]] (AEC), which took over from the Manhattan Project on January 1, 1947.{{sfn|Hershberg|1993|pp=305–309}} Legislation to create the National Science Foundation finally passed through Congress and was signed into law by Truman in 1950.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=368–369}} |
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The authority that Bush had as chairman of the RDB was much different from the power and influence he enjoyed as director of OSRD and would have enjoyed in the agency he had hoped would be independent of the Executive branch and Congress. He was never happy with the position and resigned as chairman of the RDB after a year, but remained on the oversight committee.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=336–345}} He continued to be skeptical about rockets and missiles, writing in his 1949 book, ''Modern Arms and Free Men'', that [[intercontinental ballistic missile]]s would not be technically feasible "for a long time to come ... if ever".{{sfn|Hershberg|1993|p=393}} |
The authority that Bush had as chairman of the RDB was much different from the power and influence he enjoyed as director of OSRD and would have enjoyed in the agency he had hoped would be independent of the Executive branch and Congress. He was never happy with the position and resigned as chairman of the RDB after a year, but remained on the oversight committee.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=336–345}} He continued to be skeptical about rockets and missiles, writing in his 1949 book, ''Modern Arms and Free Men'', that [[intercontinental ballistic missile]]s would not be technically feasible "for a long time to come ... if ever".{{sfn|Hershberg|1993|p=393}} |
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