War of the Fifth Coalition
Aftermath
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The war undermined French military superiority and the Napoleonic image. The Battle of Aspern-Essling was the first major defeat in Napoleon's career and was warmly greeted by much of Europe. The Austrians had shown that strategic insight and tactical ability were no longer a French monopoly.{{harvnb|Brooks|2000|p=115}} The decline in the tactical skill of the French infantry led to increasingly heavy columns of foot soldiers eschewing manoeuvres and relying on sheer weight of numbers to break through, a development best emphasized by MacDonald's attack at Wagram. The ''Armée d'Allemagne'' did not have the qualitative edge of the ''Grande Armée'' partly because raw conscripts replaced many of the veterans of Austerlitz and Jena, eroding tactical flexibility. Napoleon's armies were increasingly composed of non-French contingents, undermining morale. Although Napoleon's manoeuvers were successful, as evidenced by overturning the awful initial French position, the growing size of his armies made military strategies more difficult to manage. The scale of warfare grew too large for Napoleon to fully manage, which became evident during the next Napoleonic war, the [[French invasion of Russia]] in 1812.{{harvnb|Brooks|2000|p=114}}; {{harvnb|Gill|2020|p=47}} |
The war undermined French military superiority and the Napoleonic image. The Battle of Aspern-Essling was the first major defeat in Napoleon's career and was warmly greeted by much of Europe. The Austrians had shown that strategic insight and tactical ability were no longer a French monopoly.{{harvnb|Brooks|2000|p=115}} The decline in the tactical skill of the French infantry led to increasingly heavy columns of foot soldiers eschewing manoeuvres and relying on sheer weight of numbers to break through, a development best emphasized by MacDonald's attack at Wagram. The ''Armée d'Allemagne'' did not have the qualitative edge of the ''Grande Armée'' partly because raw conscripts replaced many of the veterans of Austerlitz and Jena, eroding tactical flexibility. Napoleon's armies were increasingly composed of non-French contingents, undermining morale. Although Napoleon's manoeuvers were successful, as evidenced by overturning the awful initial French position, the growing size of his armies made military strategies more difficult to manage. The scale of warfare grew too large for Napoleon to fully manage, which became evident during the next Napoleonic war, the [[French invasion of Russia]] in 1812.{{harvnb|Brooks|2000|p=114}}; {{harvnb|Gill|2020|p=47}} |
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Englund describes the war as "the first modern war" for the use of "symmetrical conscript armies of singularly large size," that were divided into corps and commanded decentralized in theatres. He concludes that "it was a war of magnitude and maneuver more than before and the decisive factor was attrition more than dramatic one |
Englund describes the war as "the first modern war" for the use of "symmetrical conscript armies of singularly large size," that were divided into corps and commanded decentralized in theatres. He concludes that "it was a war of magnitude and maneuver more than before and the decisive factor was attrition more than dramatic one (or two) day pitched battles."{{Sfn|Englund|2004|p=346}} |
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==Notes== |
==Notes== |
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