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Due to the economic interests in Rakhine State, [[China]] has maintained pragmatic ties with the Arakan Army. By 2022, reports indicate that China has provided substantial support with an estimation of approximately 95% the group's weaponry funding.[{{Cite web |date=2025-06-10 |title=China's long game in Rakhine State |url=https://www.borderlens.com/2025/06/10/chinas-long-game-in-rakhine-state/ |access-date=2025-06-10 |website=Borderlens |language=en-US}}][{{Cite web |date=2021-06-14 |title=The Arakan Army and China's Relationship with Ethnic Armed Organizations in Myanmar |url=https://icsin.org/blogs/2021/06/14/auto-draft/ |access-date=2025-06-10 |website=ICS Research Blog |language=en-US |archive-date=26 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230326094659/https://icsin.org/blogs/2021/06/14/auto-draft/ |url-status=live }}] However, since 2025, AA has become relevantly less dependent on China. |
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Due to the economic interests in Rakhine State, [[China]] has maintained pragmatic ties with the Arakan Army. By 2022, reports have indicated that China has provided substantial support with an estimation of approximately 95% of the group's weaponry funding.[{{Cite web |date=2025-06-10 |title=China's long game in Rakhine State |url=https://www.borderlens.com/2025/06/10/chinas-long-game-in-rakhine-state/ |access-date=2025-06-10 |website=Borderlens |language=en-US}}][{{Cite web |date=2021-06-14 |title=The Arakan Army and China's Relationship with Ethnic Armed Organizations in Myanmar |url=https://icsin.org/blogs/2021/06/14/auto-draft/ |access-date=2025-06-10 |website=ICS Research Blog |language=en-US |archive-date=26 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230326094659/https://icsin.org/blogs/2021/06/14/auto-draft/ |url-status=live }}] However, since 2025, AA has become relevantly less dependent on China. |
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The AA has expressed large support for Chinese investments in Rakhine State, welcoming the country to engage in mutually beneficial projects.[{{Cite web |date=2019-07-23 |title=Arakan Army Voices Support For Big Chinese Projects in Myanmar's Rakhine State |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/arakan-army-voices-support-07232019152712.html |access-date=2025-06-10 |website=Radio Free Asia |language=en}}][{{Cite web |title=Arakan Army welcomes Chinese president's visit to Myanmar |url=https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/arakan-army-welcomes-chinese-presidents-visit-myanmar |access-date=2025-06-10 |website=Burma News International |language=en}}] The AA has also issued statements in [[Mandarin Chinese|Mandarin]] alongside Burmese and English, reflecting the increasing influence of China.[name=]":1" /> |
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The AA has expressed large support for Chinese investments in Rakhine State, welcoming the country to engage in mutually beneficial projects.[{{Cite web |date=2019-07-23 |title=Arakan Army Voices Support For Big Chinese Projects in Myanmar's Rakhine State |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/arakan-army-voices-support-07232019152712.html |access-date=2025-06-10 |website=Radio Free Asia |language=en}}][{{Cite web |title=Arakan Army welcomes Chinese president's visit to Myanmar |url=https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/arakan-army-welcomes-chinese-presidents-visit-myanmar |access-date=2025-06-10 |website=Burma News International |language=en}}] The AA has also issued statements in [[Mandarin Chinese|Mandarin]] alongside Burmese and English. By April 2026, Chinese delegations are scheduled for talks with Arakan Army over [[Belt and Road Initiative]] railway project.[>{{Cite web |title=Beijing to hold talks with Arakan Army over BRI railway security |url=https://www.narinjara.com/news/detail/69e64c93e93643bdac1dbc15 |access-date=2026-04-20 |website=www.narinjara.com |language=en}}</ref>] |