Corruption in Iran

For example, the 2009 sale of the [[Telecommunication Company of Iran|Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI)]] stands as the most notorious example of IRGC economic expansion. A controlling stake (50% plus one share) of the firm, valued at over $8 billion, was sold to the [[Mobin Trust Consortium]], a group directly linked to the IRGC’s Etemad-e-Mobin.{{Cite web |title=IRGC Buys Majority Share of Iran Telecom – NIAC |url=https://niacouncil.org/irgc-buys-majority-share-of-iran-telecom/ |access-date=2026-01-05 |language=en-US}} The "auction" was widely criticized as a formality, it was conducted behind closed doors in a single day without competitive bidding. This acquisition did more than secure a massive revenue stream; it handed the IRGC centralized control over the nation’s digital infrastructure, fundamentally enhancing its capacity for surveillance and censorship.

For example, the 2009 sale of the [[Telecommunication Company of Iran|Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI)]] stands as the most notorious example of IRGC economic expansion. A controlling stake (50% plus one share) of the firm, valued at over $8 billion, was sold to the [[Mobin Trust Consortium]], a group directly linked to the IRGC’s Etemad-e-Mobin.{{Cite web |title=IRGC Buys Majority Share of Iran Telecom – NIAC |url=https://niacouncil.org/irgc-buys-majority-share-of-iran-telecom/ |access-date=2026-01-05 |language=en-US}} The "auction" was widely criticized as a formality, it was conducted behind closed doors in a single day without competitive bidding. This acquisition did more than secure a massive revenue stream; it handed the IRGC centralized control over the nation’s digital infrastructure, fundamentally enhancing its capacity for surveillance and censorship.

Another example is [[SADRA]] (Iran Marine Industrial Company), a struggling shipbuilding firm transferred to the IRGC’s engineering arm, [[Khatam-al Anbiya Construction Headquarters|Khatam al-Anbiya]], during the 2000s. Despite substantial government investment, SADRA largely failed to fulfill its maritime contracts, serving instead as a conduit for absorbing state subsidies and securing lucrative no-bid military contracts.{{Cite web |date=2019-04-06 |title=Submarine Battery Explosion In Iran's Military Shipyard Kills Three |url=https://en.radiofarda.com/a/submarine-battery-explosion-in-iran-s-military-shipyard-kills-three/29865339.html |access-date=2026-01-05 |website=Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty |language=en}} Simultaneously, the IRGC established a parallel financial system through institutions like Bank Ansar and Mehr Eghtesad Bank. Operated under IRGC-affiliated foundations, these banks issued high-risk, unsecured loans to Corps-linked contractors, effectively creating a "closed-loop" economy. Following intense international sanctions and internal pressure to consolidate military-linked banking, these entities were merged into the state-owned [[Bank Sepah]] in 2019 - a move that effectively nationalized their accumulated debts and transferred the financial burden to the Iranian public.

Another example is [[SADRA]] (Iran Marine Industrial Company), a struggling shipbuilding firm transferred to the IRGC’s engineering arm, [[Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters|Khatam al-Anbiya]], during the 2000s. Despite substantial government investment, SADRA largely failed to fulfill its maritime contracts, serving instead as a conduit for absorbing state subsidies and securing lucrative no-bid military contracts.{{Cite web |date=2019-04-06 |title=Submarine Battery Explosion In Iran's Military Shipyard Kills Three |url=https://en.radiofarda.com/a/submarine-battery-explosion-in-iran-s-military-shipyard-kills-three/29865339.html |access-date=2026-01-05 |website=Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty |language=en}} Simultaneously, the IRGC established a parallel financial system through institutions like Bank Ansar and Mehr Eghtesad Bank. Operated under IRGC-affiliated foundations, these banks issued high-risk, unsecured loans to Corps-linked contractors, effectively creating a "closed-loop" economy. Following intense international sanctions and internal pressure to consolidate military-linked banking, these entities were merged into the state-owned [[Bank Sepah]] in 2019 - a move that effectively nationalized their accumulated debts and transferred the financial burden to the Iranian public.

Another source of corruption is Iran's oil sector. In 2023 alone, the IRGC controlled 40–50% of Iran’s oil exports. with a worth of $25–30 billion, via its unofficial networks. The intake of fund by the [[Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps|IRGC]] drains state revenue, reducing funds available for infrastructure, education, and healthcare.{{Cite web |title=How the IRGC’s Corruption and Monopolies Have Destroyed Iranian Industry |url=https://freeiransn.com/how-the-irgcs-corruption-and-monopolies-have-destroyed-iranian-industry/ |access-date=2026-01-01 |website=The Free Iran Scholars Network |language=en-US}} Former customs officials and even members of [[Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines & Agriculture|Iran's Chamber of Commerce]] have openly acknowledged this issue. For example, in 2022, [[Masoud Karbasian]], a former Minister of Economy, stated that "the country's largest smuggling operations are conducted by institutions we are not allowed to name", an unmistakable reference to the IRGC.{{Cite web |title=How the IRGC’s Corruption and Monopolies Have Destroyed Iranian Industry |url=https://freeiransn.com/how-the-irgcs-corruption-and-monopolies-have-destroyed-iranian-industry/ |access-date=2026-01-01 |website=The Free Iran Scholars Network |language=en-US}}

Another source of corruption is Iran's oil sector. In 2023 alone, the IRGC controlled 40–50% of Iran’s oil exports. with a worth of $25–30 billion, via its unofficial networks. The intake of fund by the [[Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps|IRGC]] drains state revenue, reducing funds available for infrastructure, education, and healthcare.{{Cite web |title=How the IRGC’s Corruption and Monopolies Have Destroyed Iranian Industry |url=https://freeiransn.com/how-the-irgcs-corruption-and-monopolies-have-destroyed-iranian-industry/ |access-date=2026-01-01 |website=The Free Iran Scholars Network |language=en-US}} Former customs officials and even members of [[Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines & Agriculture|Iran's Chamber of Commerce]] have openly acknowledged this issue. For example, in 2022, [[Masoud Karbasian]], a former Minister of Economy, stated that "the country's largest smuggling operations are conducted by institutions we are not allowed to name", an unmistakable reference to the IRGC.{{Cite web |title=How the IRGC’s Corruption and Monopolies Have Destroyed Iranian Industry |url=https://freeiransn.com/how-the-irgcs-corruption-and-monopolies-have-destroyed-iranian-industry/ |access-date=2026-01-01 |website=The Free Iran Scholars Network |language=en-US}}