Siege of Breslau

|Description = Soviet infantry advancing{{notetag|the photo, which might be posed, is taken on the crossroads taken by the Soviets already in February}}

|Description = Soviet infantry advancing{{notetag|the photo, which might be posed, is taken on the crossroads taken by the Soviets already in February}}

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In early March the Soviets kept advancing from the south along the frontline of some 4.5 km length. The 359. RD moved on the left flank from northern [[Krzyki|Krietern]] towards [[Grabiszyn-Grabiszynek|Gräbschen]] and [[Gajowice|Gabitz]] (1.5 km), west of [[:pl:Ulica Gajowicka we Wrocławiu|Gabitzerstrasse]]. The 309. RD moved towards the centre between Gabitzerstrasse and [[:pl:Ulica Powstańców Śląskich we Wrocławiu|Strasse der SA]] (0.7 km). Głowiński 2025, p. 252 The 218. RD moved towards the centre between Strasse der SA and [[:pl:Ulica Ślężna we Wrocławiu|Lohenstrasse]] (0.7 km). Głowiński 2025, pp. 245 On the right flank, the 273. RD moved from [[Gaj, Wrocław|Herdain]] and [[Tarnogaj|Dürrgoy]] towards [[Huby, Wrocław|Huben]] (1.5 km). The Red Army thrust focused on the 1.5 km central section between Gabitzerstrasse and Lohenstrasse; the wings were providing auxiliary support. The opposing German line-up was the "Mohr" regiment, which in late February replaced "Wehl" along Strasse der SA, Głowiński 2025, pp. 228-229 the "Kersten" regiment along Lohenstrasse, and "Reinkober" on the German left flank, this is on the eastern section; all these regiments were reinforced by various improvised kampfgruppen, composed mostly of Volkssturm battalions attached to single Wehrmacht companies. Głowiński 2025, p. 247

In early March the Soviets kept advancing from the south along the frontline of some 4.5 km length. The 359. RD moved on the left flank from northern [[Krzyki|Krietern]] towards [[Grabiszyn-Grabiszynek|Gräbschen]] and [[Gajowice|Gabitz]] (1.5 km), west of [[:pl:Ulica Gajowicka we Wrocławiu|Gabitzerstrasse]]. The 309. RD moved towards the centre between Gabitzerstrasse and [[:pl:Ulica Powstańców Śląskich we Wrocławiu|Strasse der SA]] (0.7 km). Głowiński 2025, p. 252 The 218. RD moved towards the centre between Strasse der SA and [[:pl:Ulica Ślężna we Wrocławiu|Lohenstrasse]] (0.7 km). Głowiński 2025, pp. 245 On the right flank, the 273. RD moved from [[Gaj, Wrocław|Herdain]] and [[Tarnogaj|Dürrgoy]] towards [[Huby, Wrocław|Huben]] (1.5 km). The Red Army thrust focused on the 1.5 km central section between Gabitzerstrasse and Lohenstrasse;{{notetag|according to the pre-war terminology, the Soviets advanced in the districts of Neudorf and Kaiser-Wilhel-Viertel, partially also Gabitz; their objectives were the districts located slightly further north, i.e. Tauentzienviertel and Siebenhufen}} the wings were providing auxiliary support. The opposing German line-up was the "Mohr" regiment, which in late February replaced "Wehl" along Strasse der SA, Głowiński 2025, pp. 228-229 the "Kersten" regiment along Lohenstrasse, and "Reinkober" on the German left flank, this is on the eastern section; all these regiments were reinforced by various improvised kampfgruppen, composed mostly of Volkssturm battalions attached to single Wehrmacht companies. Głowiński 2025, p. 247

The first two weeks of March marked one of the two most fierce periods of the Breslau fighting.{{notetag|author of a massive monographic work on the Siege claims that if the number of casualties taken is calculated per square meter, fightings in the centre count among the most ferocious combat episodes of World War Two.Głowiński 2025, p. 375 In March, on some 0.5 square km, there were 6,500 casualties recorded}} On the central section, riflemen from 309. and 218. rifle divisions and the opposing "Mohr" and "Kersten" defenders were engaged in combat not for single city blocks, not for single buildings, but at times for single floors.{{notetag|references to combat for single floor or even single flat or even single room might be found in almost any narrative on the siege, be it by Russian, Polish, German or British authors. However, some advance a somewhat different narrative. According to one scholar, a standard German procedure was to burn out the first row of buildings, to blow up the second row, and place fire nests in the third row. The procedure proved effective and, according to the historian, might be applied also today, e.g. in Syria43:10 ''[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MG8imMpArcU Алексей Исаев про осаду города-крепости Бреслау],'' [in:] YT service}} The Soviets kept advancing in their shock groups, each composed of few hundred infantry supported by pioneers blowing up walls where necessary, with field guns and self-propelled artillery placed some 150-300 metres behind. The defenders employed [[Goliath tracked mine|Goliaths]] Głowiński 2025, pp. 273-274 and used to transport dismantled pieces, especially the [[8.8 cm Raketenwerfer 43|Puppchen launchers]], to upper floors.Ahlfen, Niehoff 2008, p. 102 The district, densely built up with 3-5 floor residential buildings, many of magnificent architecture, was systematically being turned into rubble.{{notetag|various measures were used, ranging from explosives to gas, depending upon objectives and availability. Sophisticated tactical scenarios were employedAhlfen, Niehoff 2008, pp. 98-103}} In every week a single Soviet division was losing some 350-500 men;{{notetag|the 218. RD in one week lost 105 KIA and 444 WIA, and was reduced to perhaps 3,900 men in total;Głowiński 2025, p. 251; during the same period the 273. RD lost 78 KIA and 281 WIAGłowiński 2025, p. 255}} German losses are not clear, yet it is known they rotated the VS battalions every some time.{{notetag|the rotating battalions withdrawn from combat were directed to rest in barracks located in the [[:pl:Różanka (Wrocław)|Rosenthal]], [[:pl:Karłowice (Wrocław)|Karlowitz]] and [[:pl:Szczytniki (Wrocław)|Scheiting]] districts, north of the Oder and some even north of the [[:pl:Stara Odra we Wrocławiu|Old Oder]]Głowiński 2025, p. 260}} The Soviet advance was painstakingly slow; until mid-March on the crucial central section they advanced some 350 metres, reaching [[:pl:Ulica Szczęśliwa we Wrocławiu|Augustastrasse]] and [[:pl:Ulica Lwowska we Wrocławiu|Victoriastrasse]]; since 10 March they were making close to no progress, Głowiński 2025, p. 259 and since 15 March no progress at all. Głowiński 2025, p. 261

The first two weeks of March marked one of the two most fierce periods of the Breslau fighting.{{notetag|author of a massive monographic work on the Siege claims that if the number of casualties taken is calculated per square meter, fightings in the centre count among the most ferocious combat episodes of World War Two.Głowiński 2025, p. 375 In March, on some 0.5 square km, there were 6,500 casualties recorded}} On the central section, riflemen from 309. and 218. rifle divisions and the opposing "Mohr" and "Kersten" defenders were engaged in combat not for single city blocks, not for single buildings, but at times for single floors.{{notetag|references to combat for single floor or even single flat or even single room might be found in almost any narrative on the siege, be it by Russian, Polish, German or British authors. However, some advance a somewhat different narrative. According to one scholar, a standard German procedure was to burn out the first row of buildings, to blow up the second row, and place fire nests in the third row. The procedure proved effective and, according to the historian, might be applied also today, e.g. in Syria43:10 ''[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MG8imMpArcU Алексей Исаев про осаду города-крепости Бреслау],'' [in:] YT service}} The Soviets kept advancing in their shock groups, each composed of few hundred infantry supported by pioneers blowing up walls where necessary, with field guns and self-propelled artillery placed some 150-300 metres behind. The defenders employed [[Goliath tracked mine|Goliaths]] Głowiński 2025, pp. 273-274 and used to transport dismantled pieces, especially the [[8.8 cm Raketenwerfer 43|Puppchen launchers]], to upper floors.Ahlfen, Niehoff 2008, p. 102 The district, densely built up with 3-5 floor residential buildings, many of magnificent architecture, was systematically being turned into rubble.{{notetag|various measures were used, ranging from explosives to gas, depending upon objectives and availability. Sophisticated tactical scenarios were employedAhlfen, Niehoff 2008, pp. 98-103}} In every week a single Soviet division was losing some 350-500 men;{{notetag|the 218. RD in one week lost 105 KIA and 444 WIA, and was reduced to perhaps 3,900 men in total;Głowiński 2025, p. 251; during the same period the 273. RD lost 78 KIA and 281 WIAGłowiński 2025, p. 255}} German losses are not clear, yet it is known they rotated the VS battalions every some time.{{notetag|the rotating battalions withdrawn from combat were directed to rest in barracks located in the [[:pl:Różanka (Wrocław)|Rosenthal]], [[:pl:Karłowice (Wrocław)|Karlowitz]] and [[:pl:Szczytniki (Wrocław)|Scheiting]] districts, north of the Oder and some even north of the [[:pl:Stara Odra we Wrocławiu|Old Oder]]Głowiński 2025, p. 260}} The Soviet advance was painstakingly slow; until mid-March on the crucial central section they advanced some 350 metres, reaching [[:pl:Ulica Szczęśliwa we Wrocławiu|Augustastrasse]] and [[:pl:Ulica Lwowska we Wrocławiu|Victoriastrasse]]; since 10 March they were making close to no progress, Głowiński 2025, p. 259 and since 15 March no progress at all. Głowiński 2025, p. 261