User:Tomas Pollak Rutgers Law/Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act

03/02/2026 Draft Below:

04/27/2026 - Final Project Below:

= (UNEDITED) Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act =

= (EDITED) Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act =

The '''Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act''' ('''JASTA''') ([[Act of Congress#Public law, private law, designation|Pub. L.]] 114–222 (text) (PDF)) is a law enacted by the [[United States Congress]] that narrows the scope of the legal doctrine of foreign [[sovereign immunity]]. It amends the [[Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act]] and the [[Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996|Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act]] in regard to [[Cause of action|civil claims]] against a foreign state for injuries, death, or damages from an act of international [[terrorism]] on U.S. soil.

The '''Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act''' ('''JASTA''') ([[Act of Congress#Public law, private law, designation|Pub. L.]] [https://www.govinfo.gov/link/plaw/114/public/222?link-type=html 114–222 (text)] ([https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-114publ222/pdf/PLAW-114publ222.pdf PDF])) is a law enacted by the [[United States Congress]] that narrows the scope of the legal doctrine of foreign [[sovereign immunity]], and establishes secondary liability for aiding and abetting in an act of international terrorism committed, planned, or authorized by a designated terrorist organization. It amends the [[Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act]], the [[Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987|Anti-Terrorism Act]], and the [[Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996|Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act]] in regard to [[Cause of action|civil claims]] against a foreign state for injuries, death, or damages from an act of international [[terrorism]] on U.S. soil.

The bill passed the [[United States Senate|Senate]] with no opposition in May 2016 and, in September 2016, was unanimously passed by the [[United States House of Representatives|House of Representatives]]. On September 28, 2016, both houses of Congress passed the bill into law after overriding [[Veto#United States|a veto]] from President Obama which had occurred five days earlier. This was the only presidential veto override of Obama's administration.{{Cite web |title=U.S. Senate |url=https://www.senate.gov/ |access-date=2026-03-01 |website=www.senate.gov}}

The bill passed the [[United States Senate|Senate]] with no opposition in May 2016 and, in September 2016, was unanimously passed by the [[United States House of Representatives|House of Representatives]]. On September 28, 2016, both houses of Congress passed the bill into law after overriding [[Veto#United States|a veto]] from President Obama which had occurred five days earlier. This was the only presidential veto override of Obama's administration.{{Cite web |title=U.S. Senate |url=https://www.senate.gov/ |access-date=2026-03-01 |website=www.senate.gov}}

The practical effect of the legislation was to allow the continuation of a longstanding civil lawsuit brought by families of victims of the [[September 11 attacks]] against [[Saudi Arabia]] for its government's [[Alleged Saudi role in September 11 attacks|alleged role in the attacks]], though the law does not mention Saudi Arabia by name.{{Cite web |last=Sen. Cornyn |first=John [R-TX |date=2016-09-28 |title=S.2040 - 114th Congress (2015-2016): Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act |url=https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2040 |access-date=2026-03-01 |website=www.congress.gov}}

The practical effect of the legislation was to allow the continuation of a longstanding civil lawsuit brought by families of victims of the [[September 11 attacks]] against [[Saudi Arabia]] for its government's [[Alleged Saudi role in September 11 attacks|alleged role in the attacks]], though the law does not mention Saudi Arabia by name.{{Cite web |last=Sen. Cornyn |first=John [R-TX |date=2016-09-28 |title=S.2040 - 114th Congress (2015-2016): Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act |url=https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2040 |access-date=2026-03-01 |website=www.congress.gov}} The legislation also enabled civil claims for "material support" and liability for acts of terrorism committed partially or entirely outside the United States that cause injury inside the United States, leading to a wide array of suits against private actors for aiding and abetting in international acts of terrorism that harmed United States citizens.{{Cite web |title=Layperson's guide - Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act {{!}} United States {{!}} Global Law Firm {{!}} Norton Rose Fulbright |url=https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/d1a384e4/laypersons-guide---justice-against-sponsors-of-terrorism-act |access-date=2026-04-24 |website=https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/d1a384e4/laypersons-guide---justice-against-sponsors-of-terrorism-act |language=en}}

== (NEW) Background: Legislative and doctrinal framework before JASTA ==

== (NEW) Background: Legislative and doctrinal framework before JASTA ==

The U.S. Congress first provided for civil remedies for injuries stemming from international acts of terrorism in the [[Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987]] ("ATA").{{Citation |title=Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 |date=2026-01-07 |work=Wikipedia |url=https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Anti-Terrorism_Act_of_1987&oldid=1331658849 |access-date=2026-03-01 |language=en}}{{Cite web |last=Sen. Grassley |first=Chuck [R-IA |date=1987-05-14 |title=All Info - S.1203 - 100th Congress (1987-1988): Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 |url=https://www.congress.gov/bill/100th-congress/senate-bill/1203/all-info |access-date=2026-03-01 |website=www.congress.gov}} The Act, in its relevant parts, establishes that "[a]ny national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees."{{Cite web |title=18 USC 2333: Civil remedies |url=https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section2333&num=0&edition=prelim |access-date=2026-03-01 |website=uscode.house.gov}}

The U.S. Congress first provided for civil remedies for injuries stemming from international acts of terrorism in the [[Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987]] (ATA).{{Citation |title=Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 |date=2026-01-07 |work=Wikipedia |url=https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Anti-Terrorism_Act_of_1987&oldid=1331658849 |access-date=2026-03-01 |language=en}}{{Cite web |last=Sen. Grassley |first=Chuck [R-IA |date=1987-05-14 |title=All Info - S.1203 - 100th Congress (1987-1988): Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 |url=https://www.congress.gov/bill/100th-congress/senate-bill/1203/all-info |access-date=2026-03-01 |website=www.congress.gov}} The Act, in its relevant parts, establishes that "[a]ny national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees."{{Cite web |title=18 USC 2333: Civil remedies |url=https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section2333&num=0&edition=prelim |access-date=2026-03-01 |website=uscode.house.gov}}

The first claims under this Act by private parties generally targeted the organizations that committed the international acts of terrorism, as primarily liable for such.{{Cite web |date=2021-02-05 |title=The Inadequate Reach of Aiding and Abetting Liability under the Antiterrorism Act |url=https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/volume-59/the-inadequate-reach-of-aiding-and-abetting-liability-under-the-antiterrorism-act |access-date=2026-03-01 |website=Columbia Journal of Transnational Law |language=en-US}} Given the difficulty of bringing foreign terrorist organizations to court, however, the chances of recovery for plaintiffs were low, even where default judgments were entered by the courts.{{Cite web |title=Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Dev. |url=https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/boim-v-holy-land-895577117 |access-date=2026-03-01 |website=vLex |language=en}} To overcome this difficulty and to provide for higher chances of recovery, plaintiffs thus began bringing suit against different parties who allegedly aided and abetted those who committed international acts of terrorism. Multinational financial institutions were a primary target, against whom plaintiffs would typically bring suit alleging "substantial assistance" to foreign terrorist organizations through the provision of banking services and different financial tools.

The first claims under this Act by private parties generally targeted the organizations that committed the international acts of terrorism, as primarily liable for such.{{Cite web |date=2021-02-05 |title=The Inadequate Reach of Aiding and Abetting Liability under the Antiterrorism Act |url=https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/volume-59/the-inadequate-reach-of-aiding-and-abetting-liability-under-the-antiterrorism-act |access-date=2026-03-01 |website=Columbia Journal of Transnational Law |language=en-US}} Given the difficulty of bringing foreign terrorist organizations to court, however, the chances of recovery for plaintiffs were low, even where default judgments were entered by the courts.{{Cite web |title=Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Dev. |url=https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/boim-v-holy-land-895577117 |access-date=2026-03-01 |website=vLex |language=en}} To overcome this difficulty and to provide for higher chances of recovery, plaintiffs thus began bringing suit against different parties who allegedly aided and abetted those who committed international acts of terrorism. Multinational financial institutions were a primary target, against whom plaintiffs would typically bring suit alleging "substantial assistance" to foreign terrorist organizations through the provision of banking services and different financial tools.

== (NEW) Judicial trend after JASTA ==

== (NEW) Judicial trend after JASTA ==

Given Congress's authorization that JASTA may apply retroactively to cases already filed in federal courts, numerous plaintiffs took leave to amend their complaints to include a cause of action for aiding and abetting under JASTA.{{Cite web |title=Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC, No. 19-3970 (2d Cir. 2023) |url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/19-3970/19-3970-2023-01-05.html |access-date=2026-04-24 |website=Justia Law |language=en}} However, the courts' interpretation of JASTA and the ''[https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/halberstam-v-welch-no-888772532 Halberstam]'' factors has led to limited liability under the amended statute. Varying interpretations of "substantial assistance" led to a Circuit split in where liability may be found under JASTA.

'''To be added:''' discussion of Circuit split in finding aiding and abetting liability under JASTA in interpreting "substantial assistance" between 2016 and 2023, pre-''Twitter v. Taamneh''.

In ''[https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/siegel-v-hsbc-n-894593093 Siegel v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc.],'' the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit|Second Circuit]] held that, in interpreting aiding and abetting liability under JASTA, it is necessary to apply theories that relate to principal liability under the ATA, meaning that the private actor must possess general awareness of their furtherance of violent or life-endangering activities, "knowingly providing substantial assistance."{{Cite web |title=Siegel v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc. |url=https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/siegel-v-hsbc-n-894593093 |access-date=2026-04-24 |website=vLex |language=en}} The court further interpreted the statute in ''[https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/20-575/20-575-2021-07-29.html Honickman v. BLOM Bank SAL],'' establishing that aiding and abetting requires more than the provision of material support to a designated terrorist organization to establish substantial assistance.{{Cite web |title=Honickman v. Blom Bank SAL, No. 20-575 (2d Cir. 2021) |url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/20-575/20-575-2021-07-29.html |access-date=2026-04-24 |website=Justia Law |language=en}} The court also stated that "substantial assistance" does not require a direct relationship between the defendant and a [[United States Department of State list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations|foreign terrorist organization]], or that the organization receive funds from the defendant. However, the court later in ''[https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/19-3970/19-3970-2023-01-05.html Freeman ex rel. est. Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC],'' clarified that a direct link between the defendant and the foreign terrorist organization was needed to establish liability under JASTA.

In ''[https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2026/01/20-7077-2155619.pdf Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd.]'', the [[United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit|D.C. Circuit]] adopted a broader interpretation of JASTA, leading to one of few instances where a court has found liability under the Act.{{Cite web |date=Jan. 23, 2026 |title=Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd. |url=https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2026/01/20-7077-2155619.pdf |url-status=live |access-date=04/24/2026 |website=US Courts}} The Court has devised a "culpability" standard based on the "knowing and substantial assistance" element, which is measured based on both requirements working in tandem, to permit a court to infer conscious and culpable assistance, with a lesser showing of one demanding a greater showing of the other. The Court also rejected a "direct traceability" test, which would require the defendants to have known all the particulars of the primary actor's plan, placing foreseeability as the primary standard. The court has identified departure from generally accepted business practices as a basis for liability under JASTA.

The [[United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|Ninth Circuit]] has adopted a broader standard to find liability for aiding and abetting international acts of terrorism under JASTA. In ''[https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/21-1333 Gonzalez v. Google LLC],'' which consolidated three separate appeals arising from district court dismissals of claims under the ATA, including ''[[Twitter v. Taamneh]]'', the court found plausible a claim that Twitter permitted the use of its platforms for the promotion of [[Islamic State|ISIS]] propaganda, even with extensive media coverage and complaints.{{Cite web |date=May 18, 2023 |title=Gonzalez v. Google LLC |url=https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/21-1333 |url-status=live |access-date=04/24/2026 |website=Oyez}} Given how integral [[X (social network)|Twitter]], [[YouTube]], and [[Google]] were to ISIS operations, and the requirement of foreseeability to establish general awareness, as well as knowingly providing substantial assistance, the court found that liability could be found, and remanded the case.

In ''[[Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh|Twitter v. Taamneh]],'' the Supreme Court sought to provide more clarity in this area of law by addressing the knowledge requirement and establishing the meaning of "substantial assistance" as understood under ''[https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/halberstam-v-welch-no-888772532 Halberstam v. Welch],'' the two main points of contention.

== (NEW) Supreme Court interpretation in ''Twitter v. Taamneh'' ==

== (NEW) Supreme Court interpretation in ''Twitter v. Taamneh'' ==

''See also'': ''[[Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh]]; [[Gonzalez v. Google LLC]].''

''See also'': ''[[Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh]]; [[Gonzalez v. Google LLC]]; [[BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman]].''

''[[Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh|Twitter v. Taamneh]]'' (2023) was the first time the [[Supreme Court of the United States|Supreme Court]] directly addressed JASTA's aiding and abetting provision.{{Cite web |title=Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh |url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/21-1496 |access-date=2026-04-24 |website=LII / Legal Information Institute |language=en}} The Court granted ''certiorari'' specifically to decide whether the use of services available to the public at large and unconnected to the specific attack itself could support JASTA liability.

In the case, the court held that the ''Halberstam'' factors should be understood "in light of the common law and applied as a framework designed to hold defendants liable when they consciously and culpably participated in a tortious act in such a way as to help make it succeed." To provide for secondary liability under JASTA, the Court determined it is necessary for there to be a nexus between the aider or abettor's acts and the specific attack under which suit is brought.

The Court further emphasized the need for [[United States Department of State list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations|foreign terrorist organization]] designation for secondary liability to potentially carry. Similarly, the Court determined the need to meet the ATA requirement of injury "by reason of" an international act of terrorism.

In sum, the Court stated that for secondary liability for aiding and abetting in international acts of terrorism to be attached to a defendant's actions under JASTA, the plaintiff must prove conscious, voluntary and culpable participation in another's wrongdoing, satisfying the following elements: (1) the defendant knowingly assisted the specific act, with general awareness of links or assistance to a foreign terrorist organization being insufficient; (2) the defendant provided substantial assistance, with passive, neutral, or algorithmic services available to all users being insufficient; and (3) the defendant had a culpable mental state tied to the actual attack, with a direct and concrete nexus between the defendant's conduct and the specific terrorist act at issue.

The [[Supreme Court of the United States|Supreme Court]] revisited JASTA in 2025, in ''[[BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman]].'' There, the Court limited the possibility of relief from judgment under [[Federal Rules of Civil Procedure|Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]] (FRCP) 60(b), requiring extraordinary circumstances to be proved for relief to be granted, replacing the more liberal approach of leave to amend under FRCP 15(a).{{Cite web |title=BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman (23-1259) |url=https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/blom-bank-sal-v-honickman/ |access-date=2026-04-25 |website=www.scotusblog.com |language=en}} The Court has since not revisited the statute.

'''To be added:''' SCOTUS interpretation of JASTA liability requirements through ''Twitter v. Taamneh'' and ''Gonzalez v. Google''. Lower court responses 2023-2026. Lack of legislative response.