User:Everest causes
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Weather was the primary cause of the disaster. Evidence suggests that the storm starting in the afternoon of 10 May produced temperatures near the summit of Everest of about −30 °C (−22 °F) and wind speeds of about 20 meters per second or 45 miles per hour. That converts into a wind chill factor of about −51 °C (−60 °F) which can cause frostbite to bare skin in two to five minutes. Some climbers and authors have claimed an even lower wind chill factor.[43][44] |
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Ineffective leadership. |
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The team leaders and guides did not enforce a turnaround time of 2:00 p.m. Many climbers summitted after 2:00 which, even if the weather had been good, did not give them sufficent time to descend to the relative safety of the South Col and Camp IV before darkness. |
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The expedition leaders did not believe that the blizzard, which hit in full force on 11 May, would be preceded by falling temperatures, increasing snowfall, and heavy winds through the late afternoon and evening of 10 May.[45] |
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A rivalry between Hall and Fischer, who were incentivized for business reasons to get their clients to the summit,[46] leading them to ignore the aforementioned weather forecasts and turnaround times.[45] |
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**Hall and Fischer anticipated a round trip time of eighteen hours from the South Col to the summit of Everest and back to the South Col and allocated three bottles of oxygen to each climber. Only one climber (guide Anatoli Boukreev) made the round trip in less that eighteen hours and all the the others ran out of oxygen which had the immediate consequences of [[hypoxia (environmental)|hypoxia]], confusion, loss of energy, and frostbite. |
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Bottlenecks at the Balcony and Hillary Step, which caused an hour-and-a-half delay in summiting. These delays were in themselves caused by delays in securing fixed ropes and the sheer number of people arriving at the bottlenecks at the same time (34 climbers on 10 May). |
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The sudden illness of two climbers at or near the summit after 15:00. |
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Unexpectedly severe oxygen deprivation sickness compromising both climbers' and guides' ability to make decisions or help others. |
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Insufficient stores of oxygen, forcing guides and rescue teams to carry bottles up to stranded climbers as the storm approached.[46] |
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Jon Krakauer has suggested that the use of bottled oxygen and commercial guides, who personally accompanied and took care of all pathmaking, equipment, and important decisions, allowed otherwise unqualified climbers to attempt to summit, thereby leading to dangerous situations and more deaths.[47] In addition, he wrote that the competition between Hall and Fischer's guiding companies may have led to Hall's decision not to turn back on 10 May after the summiting deadline of 14:00. However, it's not clear whether the guides would have been effective had they stuck to the deadline. |
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The unwillingness of the South African team's guide to help contact base camp while the other teams' radios were not sufficiently strong.[46] |
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