Political cognition

Political cognition

← Previous revision Revision as of 04:37, 23 April 2026
Line 7: Line 7:


=== Early theories of social cognition ===
=== Early theories of social cognition ===

==== Naïve scientist ====
==== Naïve scientist ====
First proposed by [[Fritz Heider]] in 1958, the Naïve scientist model{{Cite book|title=The psychology of interpersonal relations|last=Heider|first=Fritz|publisher=Wiley|year=1958|location=New York}} of cognition conceptualizes individuals as actors with limited information that want to derive an accurate understanding of the world. Much of the work done within this model focused on examining how people perceive and explain why others behave the way they do. This work served as the basis for the development of modern theories of [[Attribution (psychology)|attribution]], advanced independently by [[Harold Kelley]] and [[Bernard Weiner]]. Kelley's [[Attribution (psychology)|attribution]] theory included the interaction between three variables: consistency, consensus, and distinctiveness.{{Cite journal|last=Kelley|first=Harold|date=1973|title=The processes of causal attribution|journal=American Psychologist|volume=28|issue=2|pages=107–128|doi=10.1037/h0034225}} This interaction was summarized in Kelley's [[Covariation model]], also known as Kelley's cube. Consistency refers to whether the person exhibit the behavior across time. The more the person exhibits the behavior across time, the more representative this behavior is of the person. Consensus refers to whether other individuals exhibits the same behavior when presented in the same situation. If many individuals exhibit the same behavior, then the behavior is less informativeness of the person. Distinctiveness refers to whether the person exhibits similar behavior in other situations. The more the person exhibits the behavior in other situation, the less the behavior is representative of the individual.{{cite journal|doi=10.1016/0001-8791(84)90069-1|title=Attribution theory and unemployment: Kelley's covariation model, self-esteem, and locus of control|journal=Journal of Vocational Behavior|volume=24|pages=94–109|year=1984|last1=Hesketh|first1=Beryl}}
First proposed by [[Fritz Heider]] in 1958, the Naïve scientist model{{Cite book|title=The psychology of interpersonal relations|last=Heider|first=Fritz|publisher=Wiley|year=1958|location=New York}} of cognition conceptualizes individuals as actors with limited information that want to derive an accurate understanding of the world. Much of the work done within this model focused on examining how people perceive and explain why others behave the way they do. This work served as the basis for the development of modern theories of [[Attribution (psychology)|attribution]], advanced independently by [[Harold Kelley]] and [[Bernard Weiner]]. Kelley's [[Attribution (psychology)|attribution]] theory included the interaction between three variables: consistency, consensus, and distinctiveness.{{Cite journal|last=Kelley|first=Harold|date=1973|title=The processes of causal attribution|journal=American Psychologist|volume=28|issue=2|pages=107–128|doi=10.1037/h0034225}} This interaction was summarized in Kelley's [[Covariation model]], also known as Kelley's cube. Consistency refers to whether the person exhibit the behavior across time. The more the person exhibits the behavior across time, the more representative this behavior is of the person. Consensus refers to whether other individuals exhibits the same behavior when presented in the same situation. If many individuals exhibit the same behavior, then the behavior is less informativeness of the person. Distinctiveness refers to whether the person exhibits similar behavior in other situations. The more the person exhibits the behavior in other situation, the less the behavior is representative of the individual.{{cite journal|doi=10.1016/0001-8791(84)90069-1|title=Attribution theory and unemployment: Kelley's covariation model, self-esteem, and locus of control|journal=Journal of Vocational Behavior|volume=24|pages=94–109|year=1984|last1=Hesketh|first1=Beryl}}
Line 53: Line 54:
When voters receive information from the political elite, they almost never receive a complete and neutral account of facts. They receive an oversimplified version of the relevant information that often comes with a political frame, which interacts with the voter's predispositions. If the information is consistent with the voter's prior beliefs, then the information is accepted and stored in memory. If the information is inconsistent with the voter's prior beliefs, then the information is not accepted.{{cite journal|url=https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/events/Zaller_paper.pdf| title=What ''Nature'' and ''Origins'' Leaves Out| first=John| last=Zaller| journal=Critical Review| volume=24| issue=4| pages=569–642|year=2012|doi=10.1080/08913811.2012.807648| s2cid=144980145}}
When voters receive information from the political elite, they almost never receive a complete and neutral account of facts. They receive an oversimplified version of the relevant information that often comes with a political frame, which interacts with the voter's predispositions. If the information is consistent with the voter's prior beliefs, then the information is accepted and stored in memory. If the information is inconsistent with the voter's prior beliefs, then the information is not accepted.{{cite journal|url=https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/events/Zaller_paper.pdf| title=What ''Nature'' and ''Origins'' Leaves Out| first=John| last=Zaller| journal=Critical Review| volume=24| issue=4| pages=569–642|year=2012|doi=10.1080/08913811.2012.807648| s2cid=144980145}}


In political science, Zaller's work has been instrumental in the examination of two major types of evaluations: 1) on-line evaluations; and 2) memory-based evaluations.{{Cite web|url=https://electionstudies.org/papers-documents/conference-papers/the-psychology-of-voting-and-election-campaigns/the-psychology-of-voting-and-election-campaigns-about-the-psychology-of-voting/|title=The Psychology of Voting and Election Campaigns: About the Psychology of Voting|website=ANES {{!}} American National Election Studies|language=en-US|access-date=2019-11-25}}{{Cite journal |doi = 10.1080/10584609.2013.828143|title = How Quickly We Forget: The Duration of Persuasion Effects from Mass Communication|journal = Political Communication|volume = 30|issue = 4|pages = 521–547|year = 2013|last1 = Hill|first1 = Seth J.|last2 = Lo|first2 = James|last3 = Vavreck|first3 = Lynn|author3-link=Lynn Vavreck|author4-link=John Zaller|last4 = Zaller|first4 = John|s2cid = 143732717|url = https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6g9321sd}} On-line evaluation model asserts that individuals update their evaluations of political objects every time they acquire new information. The memory-based evaluation model asserts that individuals construct their evaluations on the spot based on information available in the working memory. Because most voters fail to recall the content of information they are exposed to during a campaign, many political scientists believed that voters rely on memory-based processes to make political judgments. On the contrary, other scholars believed that voters do update their evaluations of political objects as they acquire new information, but these updates take the form of affective evaluations.{{Cite book | doi=10.1057/9781403983114_2| chapter=First Steps Toward a Dual-Process Accessibility Model of Political Beliefs, Attitudes, and Behavior| title=Feeling Politics| pages=11–30| year=2006| last1=Lodge| first1=Milton| last2=Taber| first2=Charles| last3=Weber| first3=Christopher| isbn=978-1-349-53320-6}}{{Cite journal |jstor = 2082427|title = The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation|journal = The American Political Science Review|volume = 89|issue = 2|pages = 309–326|last1 = Lodge|first1 = Milton|last2 = Steenbergen|first2 = Marco R.|last3 = Brau|first3 = Shawn|year = 1995|doi = 10.2307/2082427|s2cid = 37154768}} Specifically, when voters receive political information—either from a political campaign or from the media—the voter processes that information and turns it into an affective evaluation that is then stored in memory. These stored affective evaluations are then used to make political decisions along with memory-based information. This process is known as the dual processing model.{{cite book|doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199545636.003.0023|year=2011|last1=Taber|first1=Charles S.|title=The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media |chapter=Political Cognition and Public Opinion |pages=368–383 |isbn=978-0199545636 }}
In political science, Zaller's work has been instrumental in the examination of two major types of evaluations: 1) on-line evaluations. And 2) memory-based evaluations.{{Cite web|url=https://electionstudies.org/papers-documents/conference-papers/the-psychology-of-voting-and-election-campaigns/the-psychology-of-voting-and-election-campaigns-about-the-psychology-of-voting/|title=The Psychology of Voting and Election Campaigns: About the Psychology of Voting|website=ANES {{!}} American National Election Studies|language=en-US|access-date=2019-11-25}}{{Cite journal |doi = 10.1080/10584609.2013.828143|title = How Quickly We Forget: The Duration of Persuasion Effects from Mass Communication|journal = Political Communication|volume = 30|issue = 4|pages = 521–547|year = 2013|last1 = Hill|first1 = Seth J.|last2 = Lo|first2 = James|last3 = Vavreck|first3 = Lynn|author3-link=Lynn Vavreck|author4-link=John Zaller|last4 = Zaller|first4 = John|s2cid = 143732717|url = https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6g9321sd}} On-line evaluation model asserts that individuals update their evaluations of political objects every time they acquire new information. The memory-based evaluation model asserts that individuals construct their evaluations on the spot based on information available in the working memory. Because most voters fail to recall the content of information they are exposed to during a campaign, many political scientists believed that voters rely on memory-based processes to make political judgments. On the contrary, other scholars believed that voters do update their evaluations of political objects as they acquire new information, but these updates take the form of affective evaluations.{{Cite book | doi=10.1057/9781403983114_2| chapter=First Steps Toward a Dual-Process Accessibility Model of Political Beliefs, Attitudes, and Behavior| title=Feeling Politics| pages=11–30| year=2006| last1=Lodge| first1=Milton| last2=Taber| first2=Charles| last3=Weber| first3=Christopher| isbn=978-1-349-53320-6}}{{Cite journal |jstor = 2082427|title = The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation|journal = The American Political Science Review|volume = 89|issue = 2|pages = 309–326|last1 = Lodge|first1 = Milton|last2 = Steenbergen|first2 = Marco R.|last3 = Brau|first3 = Shawn|year = 1995|doi = 10.2307/2082427|s2cid = 37154768}} Specifically, when voters receive political information—either from a political campaign or from the media—the voter processes that information and turns it into an affective evaluation that is then stored in memory. These stored affective evaluations are then used to make political decisions along with memory-based information. This process is known as the dual processing model.{{cite book|doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199545636.003.0023|year=2011|last1=Taber|first1=Charles S.|title=The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media |chapter=Political Cognition and Public Opinion |pages=368–383 |isbn=978-0199545636 }}


=== Priming and agenda setting ===
=== Priming and agenda setting ===
Line 66: Line 67:


=== Linked fate: black utility heuristic ===
=== Linked fate: black utility heuristic ===
In his 1994 book, ''Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics,'' Michael Dawson argues African American voters use evaluations of their group-level interests as short-cuts to determine the policy positions, vote choice, and political engagement that would safeguard their individual-level interest.{{Cite book|title=Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics.|last=Dawson|first=Michael|publisher=University of Chicago Press|year=1994}} According to Dawson, this political heuristic was developed as a consequence of the historical oppression of African Americans, which facilitated the development of the belief that individual interest was linked to the racial group interest among African Americans. Consequently, this black utility heuristic is known as linked fate. Dawson argues that racial issues override class-based differences which results in the political homogeneity of African Americans. Additional work suggests that other groups—including Whites, Asian Americans, Latinxs, and women—also exhibit linked fate.{{Cite journal |jstor = 3792120|title = Doubly Bound: The Impact of Gender and Race on the Politics of Black Women|journal = Political Psychology|volume = 19|issue = 1|pages = 169–184|last1 = Gay|first1 = Claudine|last2 = Tate|first2 = Katherine|year = 1998|doi = 10.1111/0162-895X.00098}}{{Cite journal|last=Simien|first=Evelyn M.|date=2005|title=Race, Gender, and Linked Fate|journal=Journal of Black Studies|volume=35|issue=5|pages=529–550|doi=10.1177/0021934704265899|s2cid=144094338}}{{Cite journal|last1=Sanchez|first1=Gabriel R.|last2=Masuoka|first2=Natalie|date=2010|title=Brown-Utility Heuristic? The Presence and Contributing Factors of Latino Linked Fate|journal=Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences|volume=32|issue=4|pages=519–531|doi=10.1177/0739986310383129|s2cid=144615737}}
In his 1994 book, ''Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics,'' Michael Dawson argues African American voters use evaluations of their group-level interests as short-cuts to determine the policy positions, vote choice, and political engagement that would safeguard their individual-level interest.{{Cite book|title=Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics.|last=Dawson|first=Michael|publisher=University of Chicago Press|year=1994}} According to Dawson, this political heuristic was developed as a consequence of the historical oppression of African Americans, which facilitated the development of the belief that individual interest was linked to the racial group interest among African Americans. Consequently, this black utility heuristic is known as linked fate. Dawson argues that racial issues override class-based differences which result in the political homogeneity of African Americans. Additional work suggests that other groups—including Whites, Asian Americans, Latinxs, and women—also exhibit linked fate.{{Cite journal |jstor = 3792120|title = Doubly Bound: The Impact of Gender and Race on the Politics of Black Women|journal = Political Psychology|volume = 19|issue = 1|pages = 169–184|last1 = Gay|first1 = Claudine|last2 = Tate|first2 = Katherine|year = 1998|doi = 10.1111/0162-895X.00098}}{{Cite journal|last=Simien|first=Evelyn M.|date=2005|title=Race, Gender, and Linked Fate|journal=Journal of Black Studies|volume=35|issue=5|pages=529–550|doi=10.1177/0021934704265899|s2cid=144094338}}{{Cite journal|last1=Sanchez|first1=Gabriel R.|last2=Masuoka|first2=Natalie|date=2010|title=Brown-Utility Heuristic? The Presence and Contributing Factors of Latino Linked Fate|journal=Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences|volume=32|issue=4|pages=519–531|doi=10.1177/0739986310383129|s2cid=144615737}}


Other researchers have advocated for the revision of the current linked fate measure, as it seems to be inconsistently associated with group identification and with political engagement.{{Cite journal|last1=Gay|first1=Claudine|last2=Hochschild|first2=Jennifer|last3=White|first3=Ariel|date=2016|title=Americans' Belief in Linked Fate: Does the Measure Capture the Concept?|url=https://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33973832|journal=Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics|volume=1|issue=1|pages=117–144|doi=10.1017/rep.2015.3|s2cid=145039190 |url-access=subscription}}
Other researchers have advocated for the revision of the current linked fate measure, as it seems to be inconsistently associated with group identification and with political engagement.{{Cite journal|last1=Gay|first1=Claudine|last2=Hochschild|first2=Jennifer|last3=White|first3=Ariel|date=2016|title=Americans' Belief in Linked Fate: Does the Measure Capture the Concept?|url=https://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33973832|journal=Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics|volume=1|issue=1|pages=117–144|doi=10.1017/rep.2015.3|s2cid=145039190 |url-access=subscription}}