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In his role as PCAOB Chief Economist, Schmalz has contributed to research on audit regulation reform. He co-authored a 2024 study examining how equity markets respond to audit inspection reports, finding that market-based transparency mechanisms could provide effective incentives for audit quality when issuers can be identified from inspection results.[{{cite journal |last1=Acito |first1=Andrew |last2=Amel-Zadeh |first2=Amir |last3=Anderson |first3=James |last4=Anderson |first4=William |last5=Aobdia |first5=Daniel |last6=Bourveau |first6=Thomas |last7=Brochet |first7=Francois |last8=Chen |first8=Huaizhi |last9=Fluharty-Jaidee |first9=Jonathan |last10=Schmalz |first10=Martin |display-authors=etal |date=December 2024 |title=Market-Based Incentives for Optimal Audit Quality |journal=SSRN Electronic Journal |doi=10.2139/ssrn.4997362 |url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4997362}}] |
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In his role as PCAOB Chief Economist, Schmalz has contributed to research on audit regulation reform. He co-authored a 2024 study examining how equity markets respond to audit inspection reports, finding that market-based transparency mechanisms could provide effective incentives for audit quality when issuers can be identified from inspection results.[{{cite journal |last1=Acito |first1=Andrew |last2=Amel-Zadeh |first2=Amir |last3=Anderson |first3=James |last4=Anderson |first4=William |last5=Aobdia |first5=Daniel |last6=Bourveau |first6=Thomas |last7=Brochet |first7=Francois |last8=Chen |first8=Huaizhi |last9=Fluharty-Jaidee |first9=Jonathan |last10=Schmalz |first10=Martin |display-authors=etal |date=December 2024 |title=Market-Based Incentives for Optimal Audit Quality |journal=SSRN Electronic Journal |doi=10.2139/ssrn.4997362 |url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4997362}}] |
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Schmalz has also examined labor market dynamics in auditing, proposing that monopsony power in the audit labor market could explain apparent auditor shortages rather than solely supply-side factors. He argued that market concentration may enable audit firms to suppress wages below competitive levels, leading to reduced audit quality and perceived talent shortages.[{{cite web |last=Schmalz |first=Martin |date=2024 |title=Talent "pipeline," audit quality, and other research topics of interest |publisher=Public Company Accounting Oversight Board |url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4754836}}] |
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Schmalz has also examined labor market dynamics in auditing, proposing that monopsony power in the audit labor market could explain apparent auditor shortages rather than solely supply-side factors. He argued that [[market concentration]] may enable audit firms to suppress wages below competitive levels, leading to reduced audit quality and perceived talent shortages.[{{cite web |last=Schmalz |first=Martin |date=2024 |title=Talent "pipeline," audit quality, and other research topics of interest |publisher=Public Company Accounting Oversight Board |url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4754836}}] |
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====Central Banking==== |
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====Central Banking==== |
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