Henry More
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{{For|the English Jesuit and historian|Henry More (Jesuit)}} |
{{For|the English Jesuit and historian|Henry More (Jesuit)}} |
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{{Use British English|date=August 2014}} |
{{Use British English|date=August 2014}} |
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{{Infobox philosopher |
{{Infobox philosopher |
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| region = [[Western philosophy]] |
| region = [[Western philosophy]] |
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=== Animals === |
=== Animals === |
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Henry More rejected the Cartesian doctrine of [[animal automatism]], maintaining instead that animals possess immaterial souls. While he denied that animal souls were immortal, he held that they were distinct from matter and capable of sensation and self-motion. This view was integral to his broader metaphysical system, which depended on a strict dualism between passive matter and active spirit. For More, denying souls to animals risked collapsing this distinction and opening the door to atheistic materialism.{{Cite journal |last=Muratori |first=Cecilia |date=2017-09-03 |title= |
Henry More rejected the Cartesian doctrine of [[animal automatism]], maintaining instead that animals possess immaterial souls. While he denied that animal souls were immortal, he held that they were distinct from matter and capable of sensation and self-motion. This view was integral to his broader metaphysical system, which depended on a strict dualism between passive matter and active spirit. For More, denying souls to animals risked collapsing this distinction and opening the door to atheistic materialism.{{Cite journal |last=Muratori |first=Cecilia |date=2017-09-03 |title='In human shape to become the very beast!' – Henry More on animals |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09608788.2017.1284648 |journal=[[British Journal for the History of Philosophy]] |volume=25 |issue=5 |pages=897–915 |doi=10.1080/09608788.2017.1284648 |issn=0960-8788|url-access=subscription }} |
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More regarded animals as part of divine providence, often citing their usefulness to humans—as sources of food, labour, or companionship—as evidence of design. He also argued that even wild or dangerous animals served providential ends, such as testing human courage or contributing to the beauty and complexity of creation. However, the existence of predatory and harmful animals raised theological challenges, especially concerning the [[problem of evil]]. In response, More suggested that such creatures reflected the limitations of creation rather than flaws in the divine will. |
More regarded animals as part of divine providence, often citing their usefulness to humans—as sources of food, labour, or companionship—as evidence of design. He also argued that even wild or dangerous animals served providential ends, such as testing human courage or contributing to the beauty and complexity of creation. However, the existence of predatory and harmful animals raised theological challenges, especially concerning the [[problem of evil]]. In response, More suggested that such creatures reflected the limitations of creation rather than flaws in the divine will. |
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