2023 Jetline roller coaster accident

2023 Jetline roller coaster accident

Some changes per the GA review.

← Previous revision Revision as of 05:53, 23 April 2026
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==Investigation==
==Investigation==
The accident was investigated by the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority (SHK) with assistance from Elements Materials Technology AB and the [[KTH Royal Institute of Technology]].{{rp|p=8}} The investigation began on {{date|26 June 2023}}.{{cite web |date=June 26, 2023 |title=Deadly roller coaster accident: Investigators arrive at Sweden's oldest amusement park |url=https://www.abc10.com/article/news/nation-world/deadly-roller-coaster-accident-sweden-investigation/507-8c905be5-f835-4bc5-a47d-1fcc8f427607#:~:text=Deadly%20roller%20coaster%20accident:%20Investigators%20arrive%20at,Updated:%2011:19%20AM%20PDT%20June%2026%2C%202023. |access-date=28 November 2025 |website=abc10.com |publisher=ABC 10 News}} On {{date|14 June 2024}}, SHK published the accident report, concluding the investigation.{{cite web |title=Press release |url=https://shk.se/engelska/the-swedish-accident-investigation-authority/current/news/2024-06-14-press-release#:~:text=14%20June%202024,are%20required%20on%20several%20levels. |website=shk.se |publisher=Swedish Accident Investigation Authority |access-date=28 November 2025}}
The accident was investigated by the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority (SHK) with assistance from Elements Materials Technology AB and the [[KTH Royal Institute of Technology]].{{rp|p=8}} The investigation began on {{date|26 June 2023}}.{{cite web |date=June 26, 2023 |title=Deadly roller coaster accident: Investigators arrive at Sweden's oldest amusement park |url=https://www.abc10.com/article/news/nation-world/deadly-roller-coaster-accident-sweden-investigation/507-8c905be5-f835-4bc5-a47d-1fcc8f427607#:~:text=Deadly%20roller%20coaster%20accident:%20Investigators%20arrive%20at,Updated:%2011:19%20AM%20PDT%20June%2026%2C%202023. |access-date=28 November 2025 |website=abc10.com |publisher=ABC 10 News}} On {{date|14 June 2024}}, SHK published the accident report, concluding the investigation.{{cite web |title=Press release |url=https://shk.se/engelska/the-swedish-accident-investigation-authority/current/news/2024-06-14-press-release |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250612131649/https://shk.se/engelska/the-swedish-accident-investigation-authority/current/news/2024-06-14-press-release |archive-date=2025-06-12 |website=shk.se |publisher=Swedish Accident Investigation Authority |access-date=28 November 2025}}


===Procurement and production of replacement front control arms===
===Procurement and production of replacement front control arms===
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Gröna Lund placed an order for 5 control arms with Mekosmos AB, providing copies of the original drawings. The park expected the welds to undergo [[magnetic particle inspection]], but did not specify any additional requirements for making the parts. Mekosmos subcontracted the welding to Göteborgs Mekaniska Werkstad AB (GMW) without informing Gröna Lund. GMW purchased the materials needed and performed fabrication and internal checks. According to the welder, there was uncertainty about whether a backing bar was required. The question was referred to the employee managing the order at GMW, who determined that no backing bar was needed. No further verification of this interpretation was carried out. The welder did not hold a valid qualification certificate, although he had extensive practical experience.{{rp|pp=37-39}}
Gröna Lund placed an order for 5 control arms with Mekosmos AB, providing copies of the original drawings. The park expected the welds to undergo [[magnetic particle inspection]], but did not specify any additional requirements for making the parts. Mekosmos subcontracted the welding to Göteborgs Mekaniska Werkstad AB (GMW) without informing Gröna Lund. GMW purchased the materials needed and performed fabrication and internal checks. According to the welder, there was uncertainty about whether a backing bar was required. The question was referred to the employee managing the order at GMW, who determined that no backing bar was needed. No further verification of this interpretation was carried out. The welder did not hold a valid qualification certificate, although he had extensive practical experience.{{rp|pp=37-39}}


The five front control arms were completed in {{date|January 2020}} and sent for magnetic particle inspection, which did not detect any defects. They were delivered to Gröna Lund in early spring of 2020. One of the arms was identified as damaged during manufacturing and set aside for scrapping, though it remained in storage. The remaining arms were installed on the trains. SHK concluded that the control arm that failed during the accident was one of the components manufactured from this order.{{rp|pp=39-40}}
The five front control arms were completed in {{date|January 2020}} and sent for magnetic particle inspection, which did not detect any defects. They were delivered to Gröna Lund in early spring of 2020. One of the arms was found to have been damaged during manufacturing and was set aside for scrapping, though it remained in storage. The others were installed on the trains. SHK concluded that the control arm that failed during the accident was one of the components manufactured from this order.{{rp|pp=39-40}}


===Cause of the derailment===
===Cause of the derailment===
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===Cause of the ejection and injuries of the riders===
===Cause of the ejection and injuries of the riders===
The lap bars were designed to meet the standards in place when they were built, and no defects were found in them. When passengers were thrown forward, they put force on the lap bars that the bars were not designed for. This caused the lap bars to bend, some of which bent enough to be entirely open. Only one lap bar did not bend at all. The lap bars being bent out of their locked position caused three riders to be ejected from the train. Testing showed that the restraints secured riders properly during normal operations and emergency stops. According to SHK, it is likely the restraints were not designed with anticipation that riders would experience the amount of force that was subjected upon them during the accident.
The lap bars were designed to meet the standards in place when they were built, and no defects were found in them. When passengers were thrown forward, they put forces on the lap bars that the bars were not designed to withstand. This caused the lap bars to bend, some of which bent enough to be entirely open. Only one lap bar did not bend at all. The lap bars being bent out of their locked position caused three riders to be ejected from the train. Testing showed that the restraints secured riders properly during normal operations and emergency stops. According to SHK, it is likely the restraints were not designed with anticipation that riders would experience the amount of force that was subjected upon them during the accident.


==Aftermath==
==Aftermath==
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* Gröna Lund was recommended to improve its approach to attraction safety, including more rigorous and ongoing risk identification, writing procedures for ensuring replacement parts comply with original attraction requirements, and regularly review and update safety procedures.{{rp|p=57}}
* Gröna Lund was recommended to improve its approach to attraction safety, including more rigorous and ongoing risk identification, writing procedures for ensuring replacement parts comply with original attraction requirements, and regularly review and update safety procedures.{{rp|p=57}}
* The Swedish Police Authority was recommended to conduct a review of regulations regarding amusement rides, including clearer operator responsibilities, systematic safety work requirements, specific inspection criteria, and improved record-keeping.{{rp|p=57}}
* The Swedish Police Authority was recommended to review amusement-ride regulations, including operator responsibilities, safety requirements, inspection standards, and record-keeping.
{{rp|p=57}}
* The Swedish government was recommended to strengthen public oversight of amusement parks and fairs through ongoing oversight, supervisory visits, and improved guidance to operators on compliance.{{rp|p=58}}
* The Swedish government was recommended to strengthen public oversight of amusement parks and fairs through ongoing oversight, supervisory visits, and improved guidance to operators on compliance.{{rp|p=58}}
* The [[International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions]] (IAAPA) was recommended to share the final report with its members so they could consider whether restraint requirements for other rides should be changed.{{rp|p=58}}
* The [[International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions]] (IAAPA) was recommended to share the final report with its members so they could consider whether restraint requirements for other rides should be changed.{{rp|p=58}}


===Criminal case===
===Criminal case===
After the incident, police launched a criminal investigation into the accident with possible charges of involuntary manslaughter, causing bodily harm and danger to others.{{cite news |title=Swedish government investigators launch probe of deadly roller coaster accident |url=https://apnews.com/article/roller-coaster-accident-grona-lund-a7f89a983414577ae7f988f472d3eba6 |access-date=28 November 2025 |work=Associated Press News |date=26 June 2023}}
After the incident, police opened a criminal investigation into the accident on suspicion of "involuntary manslaughter", "causing bodily harm and danger to others".{{cite news |title=Swedish government investigators launch probe of deadly roller coaster accident |url=https://apnews.com/article/roller-coaster-accident-grona-lund-a7f89a983414577ae7f988f472d3eba6 |access-date=28 November 2025 |work=Associated Press News |date=26 June 2023}}


In early {{date|November 2025}}, the criminal trial began against Gröna Lund, Mekosmos AB, and the defunct GMW. The companies were charged with "gross negligence causing death", gross negligence causing bodily harm, and causing danger to others. Prosecutors sought {{Currency|amount=12000000|code=SEK}} from Gröna Lund and {{Currency|amount=3000000|code=SEK}} from each [[subcontractor]].{{cite news |title=Film of the fatal accident in Jetline was shown in court |url=https://swedenherald.com/article/film-of-fatal-accident-played-in-court |publisher=Sweden Herald |date=November 10, 2025 | access-date=28 November 2025}}
In early {{date|November 2025}}, the criminal trial began against Gröna Lund, Mekosmos AB, and the defunct GMW. The companies were charged with "gross negligence causing death", "gross negligence causing bodily harm", and "causing danger to others". Prosecutors sought {{Currency|amount=12000000|code=SEK}} from Gröna Lund and {{Currency|amount=3000000|code=SEK}} from each [[subcontractor]].{{cite news |title=Film of the fatal accident in Jetline was shown in court |url=https://swedenherald.com/article/film-of-fatal-accident-played-in-court |publisher=Sweden Herald |date=November 10, 2025 | access-date=28 November 2025}}


On {{date|28 January 2026}}, Gröna Lund was sentenced by the [[Stockholm District Court]] and fined {{Currency|amount=5200000|code=SEK}}. GMW was fined {{Currency|amount=1300000|code=SEK}}, while Mekosmos was acquitted.{{cite news |title=Gröna Lund convicted for fatal Jetline accident in 2023 |url=https://swedenherald.com/article/grona-lund-sentenced-to-corporate-fine-over-2023-fatal-accident |access-date=28 January 2026 |agency=Sweden Herald |date=28 January 2026}}
On {{date|28 January 2026}}, Gröna Lund was sentenced by the [[Stockholm District Court]] and fined {{Currency|amount=5200000|code=SEK}}. GMW was fined {{Currency|amount=1300000|code=SEK}}, while Mekosmos was acquitted.{{cite news |title=Gröna Lund convicted for fatal Jetline accident in 2023 |url=https://swedenherald.com/article/grona-lund-sentenced-to-corporate-fine-over-2023-fatal-accident |access-date=28 January 2026 |agency=Sweden Herald |date=28 January 2026}}