1996 Mount Everest disaster
Causes of the disaster: formatting
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** The expedition leaders did not believe that the blizzard, which hit in full force on 11 May, would be preceded by falling temperatures, increasing snowfall, and heavy winds through the late afternoon and evening of 10 May.{{cite book |last=Ratcliffe |first=Graham |title=A Day to Die for : 1996 : Everest's worst disaster : the untold true story |publisher=Mainstream |publication-place=Edinburgh |year=2011 |url=https://dokumen.pub/a-day-to-die-for-1996-everests-worst-disaster-one-survivors-personal-journey-to-uncover-the-truth-9781907195990-1907195998.html|isbn=9781845966386 |oclc=671466084 |page=163-173}} Print editions may have different paginations. |
** The expedition leaders did not believe that the blizzard, which hit in full force on 11 May, would be preceded by falling temperatures, increasing snowfall, and heavy winds through the late afternoon and evening of 10 May.{{cite book |last=Ratcliffe |first=Graham |title=A Day to Die for : 1996 : Everest's worst disaster : the untold true story |publisher=Mainstream |publication-place=Edinburgh |year=2011 |url=https://dokumen.pub/a-day-to-die-for-1996-everests-worst-disaster-one-survivors-personal-journey-to-uncover-the-truth-9781907195990-1907195998.html|isbn=9781845966386 |oclc=671466084 |page=163-173}} Print editions may have different paginations. |
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** A rivalry between Hall and Fischer, who were incentivized for business reasons to get their clients to the summit leading them to ignore the aforementioned weather forecasts and turnaround times.{{snf|Ratcliffe|2011|pages=38-39, 163-173}} |
** A rivalry between Hall and Fischer, who were incentivized for business reasons to get their clients to the summit leading them to ignore the aforementioned weather forecasts and turnaround times.{{snf|Ratcliffe|2011|pages=38-39, 163-173}} |
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**Hall and Fischer anticipated a round trip time of not more than eighteen hours from the South Col to the summit of Everest and back to the South Col and allocated three bottles of oxygen to each climber. Only one climber (guide Anatoli Boukreev) made the round trip in less that eighteen hours and all others ran out of oxygen which had the immediate consequences of [[Altitude sickness]], confusion, loss of energy, and frostbite.{{sfn|Boukreev|De Walt|1999|pages=130-131}} |
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* The unwillingness of the [[1996 South African Everest expedition|South African team's]] guide to help contact base camp while the other teams' radios were not sufficiently strong.{{harvnb|Krakauer|1997}} |
* The unwillingness of the [[1996 South African Everest expedition|South African team's]] guide to help contact base camp while the other teams' radios were not sufficiently strong.{{harvnb|Krakauer|1997}} |
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* Bottlenecks at the Balcony and Hillary Step, which caused an hour-and-a-half delay in summiting. These delays were in themselves caused by delays in securing fixed ropes and the sheer number of people arriving at the bottlenecks at the same time (34 climbers on 10 May). |
* Bottlenecks at the Balcony and Hillary Step, which caused an hour-and-a-half delay in summiting. These delays were in themselves caused by delays in securing fixed ropes and the sheer number of people arriving at the bottlenecks at the same time (34 climbers on 10 May). |
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